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Abstract
Throughout history, cultural property has permanently been at risk in armed conflict as 
belligerents always aimed at razing to the ground or plundering the enemy’s cultural heritage. 
Cultural property is a war victim time and again, either by armed attack or by collateral damage. 
This background opens the way for new insights into research on cultural heritage protection 
as a security issue in the 21st century. In order to fight the root causes of heritage destruction 
and extremism, UNESCO is advocating strongly a comprehensive approach, using also its “soft 
power” across the Organization’s mandate. Thus, despite its limited resources, UNESCO is an 
important actor in promoting a culture of peace, justice and tolerance on a worldwide scale.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Throughout history, cultural property has permanently been at risk 
in armed conflict. As Roger O’Keefe put it, belligerents always aimed 
at razing to the ground or plundering the enemy’s cultural heritage.1 
Cultural property is a war victim time and again, either by armed attack 
or by collateral damage.
Still, the vulnerability of cultural heritage in the 21st century has 
increased. Since the year 2001 when the Taliban shocked the world 
community by turning the Buddha statues in the Valley of Bamiyan into 
rubble2 while at the same time the country was stripped of its cultural 
1  Roger O’Keefe, “Protection of Cultural Property” in Andrew Clapham and Paola 
Gaeta, eds., The Oxford Handbook of International Law in Armed Conflict, Oxford 
University Press, 2014, pp. 492-520, p. 492.
2  For detail see Francesco Francioni and Federico Lenzerini, “The Destruction of the 
Buddhas of Bamiyan in International Law”, European Journal of International Law, 
vol. 14, 2003, pp. 619-652.
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heritage by a booming antiquities trade,3 attacks against cultural heritage 
have become a continuous phenomenon in international relations and 
consequently also a topic for the United Nations system, especially for 
the UN Security Council and the UN specialized agency UNESCO.
Due to the political vacuum and the humanitarian crises created by 
the war in Afghanistan, but also subsequently in Iraq, Libya, Mali and 
Syria, non-state actors and terrorist groups started to exploit cultural 
heritage as a fundraising mechanism for financing their activities and 
a war tactic.4 Intentional destructions of cultural heritage have become 
“a ‘corollary’ of broader actions, normally carried out in the context of 
armed conflicts or systematic terrorist campaigns”5.
Not only innocent people and communities are targeted, but in many 
cases also their tangible and intangible cultural heritage, amounting to 
what has been described as a “deliberate targeting trend”6. Symbolic 
cultural heritage – not least because of its iconic posture – is a target for 
destruction, “but with a modern, post 9/11 terrorist framework iconic 
cultural heritage is at greater risk than in the past”7.
This background opens the way for new insights into research on 
3  Massoud Ansari, “Plundering Afghanistan: A Booming Antiquities Trade Strips the 
Country of its Cultural Heritage”. Archaeology, vol. 55, no. 1, 2002, pp. 18-20, p. 
20: “Archaeologists, meanwhile, fear that if the present rate of smuggling continues, 
Afghanistan’s children will have to go overseas to learn of their country’s cultural 
heritage.”
4  Thomas G. Weiss and Nina Connelly, “Cultural Cleansing and Mass Atrocities. Pro-
tecting Cultural Heritage in Armed Conflict Zones”, J. Paul Getty Trust Occasional 
Papers in Cultural Heritage Policy, no. 1, 2017, p. 20.
5  Federico Lenzerini, “Terrorism, Conflicts and Responsibility to Protect Cultural 
Heritage”, The International Spectator, vol. 51, no. 2, 2016, pp. 70-85, p. 76.
6  Marina Lostal, Kristin Hausler and Pascal Bongard, “Armed Non-State Actors and 
Cultural Heritage in Armed Conflict”, International Journal of Cultural Property, 
vol. 24, no. 4, 2017, pp. 407-427, p. 411; concerning the notion of “deliberate”, see 
Marina Lostal, International Cultural Heritage Law in Armed Conflict, Cambridge 
University Press, 2017, p. 112 ff. who argues that a “threefold test” is necessary when 
World Cultural Heritage is affected.
7  Claire Smith, Heather Burke, Cherrie de Leiuen and Gary Jackson, “The Islamic 
State’s Symbolic War: Da’esh’s socially mediated terrorism as a threat to cultural 
heritage”, Journal of Social Archaeology, vol. 16, no. 2, 2016, pp. 164-188, p. 181.
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cultural heritage protection8 as a security issue in the 21st century. 
II. CHARACTERISTICS OF CULTURAL CULTURAL 
HERITAGE DESTRUCTION IN THE 21ST CENTURY
Since the adoption of the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection 
of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict after World War II,9 
the nature of conflicts has changed largely.
A. EXTENSIVE INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICTS AND 
TERRORIST ATTACKS
One of the key differences between past and present-day armed 
conflict is that nowadays, most armed conflicts are non-international 
in character, with the result that these conflicts that take place involve 
armed non-state actors (e.g. liberation movements, rebel groups, 
freedom fighters, insurgents, terrorists) who are present in the territories 
of the conflicting zones.10 A non-international armed conflict exists when 
a “protracted armed confrontation occurring between governmental 
armed forces and the forces of one or more armed groups, or between 
such groups arising on the territory of a State” takes place, provided that 
the confrontation reaches “a minimum level of intensity and the parties 
involved in the conflict must show a minimum of organisation”.11 
Thus, an internal armed conflict is the typical situation that involves 
non-state armed groups and terrorist groups alike, resulting in the 
8  As Roger O’Keefe suggested, “protection” means “protection from damage and 
destruction and from, all forms of misappropriation”, O’Keefe see note 1, p. 492.
9  249 U.N.T.S. 240, entry into force: 7 August 1956.
10  Lostal, Hausler, Bongard see note 6, p. 409.
11  ICRC, “How is the Term ‘Armed Conflict’ Defined in International Humanitar-
ian Law”, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Opinion Paper March 
2008, p. 5. See also Art. 1 (1) Protocol Additional II to the Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed 
Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 June 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609, entry onto force: 7 December 
1978; for detail cf. Eric David, “Internal (Non-International) Armed Conflict” in An-
drew Clapham and Paola Gaeta, eds., The Oxford Handbook of International Law in 
Armed Conflict, Oxford University Press, 2014, pp. 353-362, p. 356. See also ICTY, 
Prosecutor v Dusko Tadic a/k/a “Dule”, Decision on the Defense Motion for Inter-
locutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995, para. 70.
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doctrinal problem that there is just a fine line between organized armed 
groups and terrorist groups.12 While the former incur obligations under 
international humanitarian law, including the protection of cultural 
heritage (e.g. Art. 19 and 4 Hague Convention for the Protection of 
Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict (1954) and its 
Second Protocol (1999); Art. 16 Additional Protocol II to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, relating to the Protection of Victims of 
Non-international Armed Conflicts”) the latter are generally regarded 
as “hostis humani generis”13 or as “an enemy of mankind”.14
But what are the characteristics of a “terrorist group”? Despite 
intensive international effort and debate,15 there is no binding, universally 
agreed definition of “terrorism” applicable to all fields of international 
law. The fact that a binding definition of “terrorism” is still missing may 
explain, according to Federico Lenzerini, that “any legal elaboration, 
concerning the possible consequences of an act of destruction of cultural 
heritage perpetrated within the context of a wider terrorist campaign, is 
contaminated ex ante by the impossibility of defining what ‘terrorism’ 
actually means”16.
12  Sabine von Schorlemer, “Liberation Movements” in Rüdiger Wolfrum, ed., United 
Nations: Law, Policies and Practice, München, 1995, vol. 2, pp. 854-864.
13  Cf. Douglas R. Burgess Jr., “Hostis Humani Generi: Piracy, Terrorism and a New 
International Law”, University of Miami International & Comparative Law Review, 
vol. 13, 2006, pp. 293–342, p. 341: “That is the task of terrorism law: to affect a bul-
wark against the anarchy inherent in a conflict without territorial boundaries, obvious 
contestants, or legal parameters. It is a task that can only be met by giving terrorists 
their correct legal status as hostis humani generi under the law”.
14  Elimma C. Ezeani, “The 21st Century Terrorist: Hostis Humani Generis?”, Beijing 
Law Review, vol. 3, no. 4, 2012, pp. 158-169, p. 168: “For the international commu-
nity, the perception of the terrorist regardless of his modus operandi, as an enemy of 
mankind, is vital to any international effort at punishing and deterring the violence 
of terrorism”.
15  Alex P. Schmid, Political Terrorism: A Research Guide, Brunswick, NJ, Transaction 
Books, 1984; Anthony Richards, “Conceptualizing Terrorism”, Studies in Conflict & 
Terrorism, vol. 37, no. 3, 2014, pp. 213-236; see Sami Zeidan, “Desperately seeking 
definition: The International Community’s Quest for Identifying the Specter of Terror-
ism”, Cornell International Law Journal, vol. 36, no. 3, 2004, pp. 491-496; Dominik 
Steiger, “Das Ringen um eine rechtliche Definition des Begriffs ‚Terrorismus‘ auf 
internationaler Ebene” in Kerstin Odendahl, ed., Die Bekämpfung des Terrorismus 
mit Mitteln des Völker- und Europarechts, Duncker & Humblot, 2017, pp. 45-86, p. 7.
16  Lenzerini see note 5, p. 77.
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For that reason, the effort to establish a universal comprehensive 
definition of terrorism in the UN General Assembly’s “Draft 
Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism” is important.17 
In contrast to the International Convention on the Suppression of 
the Financing of Terrorism18 the draft definition in Art. 2 (1) of the 
Comprehensive Convention does include cultural property, mentioning 
“serious damage to public or private property, including a place of public 
use”. As Christian Walter rightly emphasizes, this indicates “a tendency 
in international law to extend the notion of terrorism to destructive 
violence against objects, a development which corresponds with 
recent trends in national law.”19 However, having started in 1996, the 
negotiations regarding the Comprehensive Convention on International 
Terrorism are deadlocked because of the controversy regarding the 
definition of terrorism and related to that, the scope of application of 
the future treaty.
Obviously, the existing “fine line” between organised non-state 
armed groups and terrorist groups is about to be blurred further by 
17 Ad Hoc Committee established in General Assembly Resolution 51/210, A/
RES/51/210, 16 January 1997, http://legal.un.org/docs/?symbol=A/RES/51/210, 
para. 9; see also General Assembly Resolution 53/106 (para. 11),  Resolution 54/110 
(para. 12), 55/158 (para. 13), 56/88 (para. 16), 57/27 (para. 16) and 58/81 (para. 14). 
As to the Draft see Report of the Ad Hoc Committee established by General Assembly 
resolution 51/210 of 17 December 1996, 6th session (28 January-1 February 2002) by 
United Nations General Assembly [UN Doc A/57/37], Annex I.-VI. For more detail 
cf. Mahmoud Hmoud, “Negotiating the Draft Comprehensive Convention on Inter-
national Terrorism. Major Bones of Contention”, Journal of International Criminal 
Justice, vol. 4, no. 5, 2006, pp. 1031–1043. 
18  The International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrrorism 
(adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in resolution 54/109 of 9 
December 1999) in its Art. 2 1) b) presents a universal definition, including any “act 
intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian (…), when the purpose 
of such act, by its nature or its context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a 
government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act”. 
19  Christian Walter, “Terrorism”, The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public Interna-
tional Law, 2011, para. 9. Critical, however, Steiger, see note 15, p. 78 who objects 
including “violence against objects” in a definition of terrorism.
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recent Security Council resolutions.20 For example, in 2014 the Security 
Council reaffirmed “that all parties, including ISIL, associated armed 
groups, and other militias, must respect the human rights of the Iraqi 
people and abide by all applicable obligations under international 
humanitarian law (…)”21. One year later, in Resolution 2233 (2015), 
as of 29 July 2015, the Council took up the same wording, reaffirming 
“that all parties, including ISIL, associated armed groups, and militias, 
must respect human rights and abide by all applicable obligations under 
international humanitarian law, including those protecting the civilian 
population, by which both official Iraqi forces and member states that 
assist them must also abide”22.
Still, it is doubted whether a wholesale embracement of rights and 
obligations of terrorist groups is the right way to go. Terrorists operate in 
the shadow of an existing rather amorph entity; terrorist organisations, 
as for example Al-Qaida, nowadays have “fewer imperatives for a 
centralized structure or vertical (hierarchical) organisation and a greater 
propensity for horizontal networks which span time zones and territory 
and in which influence and power are multidirectional”.23 In addition 
to that, generally terrorists see themselves not bound by the rules of 
international humanitarian law/human rights: “Most importantly, they 
are not under any illusions that they are bound by any law, domestic or 
international”.24 
In order to come under the umbrella of international humanitarian 
20  Christian Tomuschat, “The Applicability of Human Rights Law to Insurgent Move-
ments” in Horst Fischer, Ulrike Froissart, Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, Christian 
Raap, eds., Krisensicherung und Humanitärer Schutz – Crisis Management and Hu-
manitarian Protection, Festschrift für Dieter Fleck, Berliner Wissenschaftsverlag, 
2004, pp. 573-591, p. 586; Andrew Clapham, “Focusing on Armed Non-State Actors” 
in Andrew Clapham and Paola Gaeta, eds., The Oxford Handbook of International 
Law in Armed Conflict, Oxford University Press, 2014, pp. 776-810, p. 770.
21  UN Security Council, UN Doc. S/PRST/2014/20, 19 September 2014, preamble 
para. 6.
22  UN Security Council, UN Doc. S/Res/2233 (2015), 29 July 2015, preamble para. 
15 (emphasis added by the author).
23  Smith, Burke, de Leiuen, Jackson see note 7, p. 168 quoting Ersun N. Kurtulus, 
“The ‘New Terrorism’ and its Critics”, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, vol. 34, no. 6, 
2011, pp. 476-500, p. 483, 489, 490.
24  Ezeani see note 14, p. 164.
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law, an armed group must be able and willing to follow the rules 
of humanitarian law and in order to do so, it has to be organised to 
a sufficient degree by an internal hierarchical structure and a certain 
extent of territorial control. Whether this is the case is a complex issue, 
depending also on the circumstances of the hostilities. 
If we take, for example, the violent acts in Afghanistan in the early 
21st century, we have to distinguish different settings: In a first period, 
when the Taliban destructed the Buddha statues in 2001, there was 
an internal armed conflict in some parts of the country. However, this 
internal armed conflict reportedly was not taking place precisely in the 
region of the Bamiyan Valley, where most of the monumental Buddha 
statues were located.25 The destruction was not directly connected 
to that conflict and as a result, the rules protecting cultural heritage 
in situations of armed conflict were not applicable to that situation. 
Consequently, those who destroyed the cultural objects were not to be 
prosecuted for a war crime. 
In contrast to that, in a second period from 2002 onwards, international 
humanitarian law, including obligations concerning cultural property, 
was applicable: After ousting the Taliban government in Afghanistan 
(2001-02), the newly installed Afghan government and coalition forces 
were fighting against various armed groups, among them the Taliban: 
“This amounted to a non-international armed conflict”.26 Because the 
violent acts reached the required degree of intensity (“protracted”) and 
the Taliban who engaged in such acts were sufficiently organized, that 
situation amounted to a non-international armed conflict with ensuing 
binding rules for organized armed non-state actors. 
B. INCREASE IN SYSTEMATIC AND DELIBERATE ACTS 
Another special feature related to armed conflicts in recent times 
25  Stephen Tanner, Afghanistan: A Military History from Alexander the Great to the 
War against the Taliban, Da Capo Press, 2009, p. 219; Kristin Hausler, “Culture under 
Attack: The Destruction of Cultural Heritage by Non-State Armed Groups”, Santand-
er Art & Cultural Law Review, vol. 2, no. 1, 2015, pp. 117-146, p. 130; Lostal see 
note 6, p. 35.
26  Jan K. Kleffner, “Scope of Application of International Humanitarian Law” in Di-
eter Fleck, ed., The Handbook of International Humanitarian Law, Oxford University 
Press, 2013, pp. 43-78, p. 51.
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concerns the increase of heritage attacks. Deliberate and systematic 
acts against cultural heritage have spread to a considerable extent since 
the wanton demolition of the Buddha statues in Afghanistan in March 
2001. In addition to the inherent risks for cultural monuments and 
archaeological sites by fighting in combat zones, instability in conflict-
ridden host countries is conducive for looting and illegal trafficking of 
movable cultural objects. 
The reasons for the increase in systematic and deliberate acts of 
annihilation of cultural heritage are complex, related, among others, 
to poverty, ideology, demonstration of power, terrorist propaganda and 
fragmentation of societies.27 Financial reasons may play a role as well: 
Due to the high commercial value of movable antiquities in international 
markets, the way how they are exploited by non-state actors has 
changed. Plundering and illegal trafficking of antiquities take place in 
an organized and thoroughly-planned manner. In Iraq and Syria, ISIL 
even had put in place a systematic looting plan through its Antiquities 
division, thus raising funds through the issuing of licenses for digging 
of archaeological objects and collecting taxes for trafficking.28  
Organised trade in looted artefacts from conflict zones is flourishing 
in many parts of the world, supported not only by unscrupulous diggers 
but also by illegal traders and/or art collectors who are willing to 
buy valuable objects, e.g. from the Middle East, with unclear illegal 
provenance. Also, the possibility of new advanced sales channels like 
the Dark Web and the use of almost untraceable payment methods 
like Bitcoin seem to be drivers for illegal activities and smuggling.29 
Moreover, in some cases, cultural artefacts are used as a “currency in 
weapons transactions”.30
27  With further references Sabine von Schorlemer, Kulturgutzerstörung. Die Auslösc-
hung von Kulturerbe in Krisenländern als Herausforderung für die Vereinten Na-
tionen, Nomos, 2016, pp. 123-151.
28  Schorlemer see note 27, p. 271.
29  Gabriel Weimann, “Going Dark: Terrorism on the Dark Web.”, Studies in Conflict 
& Terrorism, vol. 39, no. 3,  2016, pp. 195-206, p. 196; see also Katie A. Paul, Ancient 
Artifacts v. Digital Artifacts: New Tools for Unmasking the Sale of Illicit Antiquities 
on the Dark Web, 13 February 2018, https://www.mdpi.com/2076-0752/7/2/12/htm.
30  Erik Nemeth, “Cultural Security: The Evolving Role of Art in International Secu-
rity”, Terrorism and Political Violence, vol. 19, no.1, 2007, pp. 19-42, p. 32. 
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C. CULTURAL CLEANSING AND MASS ATROCITIES
Cultural cleansing31 seems to be evolving into a new atrocity crime 
in the 21st century. The denial of cultural identity and desecration of 
historic monuments, combined with the intentional and systematic 
destruction of cultural heritage, defined as cultural cleansing,32 has 
become a typical feature of recent heritage attacks by non-state actors. 
As the 2017 UNESCO Strategy for the Reinforcement of 
UNESCO’s Action for the Protection of Culture and the Promotion 
of Cultural Pluralism in the Event of Armed Conflict observed, recent 
attacks are characterized by the “deliberate targeting of individuals and 
groups on the basis of their cultural, ethnic or religious affiliations”33. 
Cultural cleansing, the UNESCO Strategy explains, “aims to eradicate 
cultural diversity from a geographical area and replace it with a single, 
homogeneous cultural and religious perspective.”34 
The J. Paul Getty Trust Paper Cultural Cleansing and Mass 
Atrocities, by Thomas Weiss and Nina Connelly, described cultural 
cleansing and ethnic cleansing as “evocative”: “both capture dramatic 
crimes that shock the human conscience”.35 That means, going hand 
in hand with a quantitative change by increasing hostile acts against 
cultural heritage, we face a qualitative change as well: Cruelty36 and the 
31  Irina Bokova, “Fighting Cultural Cleansing: Harnessing the Law to Preserve Cul-
tural Heritage”, Harvard International Review, vol. 36, no. 4, 2015, pp. 40-45, pp. 40 
f.
32  38 C/Resolution 48; revised on 24 October 2017 (UNESCO Doc. 39/C/57), 24 
October 2017, para. 2.
33  UNESCO Strategy for the Reinforcement of UNESCO’s Action for the Protection 
of Culture and the Promotion of Cultural Pluralism in the Event of Armed Conflict 
(38 C/Resolution 48); revised on 24 October 2017 (UNESCO Doc. 39/C/57), 24 Oc-
tober 2017, para 2. However, on 19 June 2017, the UN General Assembly adopted 
a Resolution ”Strengthening the Capability of the United Nations System to Assist 
Member States in implementing the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strat-
egy (A/RES/71/291), where it was reaffirmed that terrorism and violent extremism 
“should not be associated with any religion, nationality, civilization or ethnic group” 
(Preamble para. 9).
34  38 C/Resolution 48; revised on 24 October 2017 (UNESCO Doc. 39/C/57), 24 
October 2017, para. 2.
35  Weiss and Connelly see note 4, p. 9.
36  The Head of the Antiquities in Palmyra, Khaled-al-Assad, was assassinated in 2015 
after refusing to cooperate with ISIL and disclose the location of some of the site’s 
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tendency to commit mass atrocities against civilian populations have 
reached new peaks: For example, in 2015, the so-called Islamic State 
(ISIL/Da’esh) was reported to have been burning agricultural fields to 
devastate the landscapes of livelihood and the sources of subsistence for 
Kurdish communities in parts of Syria, adjacent to the Turkish border, 
thus pursuing a policy of “scorched earth”, with heritage destruction as 
“part and parcel”.37
D. THE USE OF NETWORKED MEDIA
In recent times, intentional attacks against cultural heritage became 
connected with the use of networked (social) media. Due to its high 
visual potential and impact of cultural property destruction not only on 
the local but also on the international audience,38 cultural heritage may 
even be prone more than ever before to become a victim of intentional 
attacks.
For example, in 2001 the Taliban presented the Bamiyan statues’ 
demolition as a premeditated, well-orchestrated act of destruction in the 
international media. Thus, the Bamiyan Buddhas statues in Afghanistan 
were viewed as one of the first examples of global communications 
being used to intensify the impact of cultural heritage destruction.39 
The “immense size and consequent value of the statues as symbols of 
antiquities, UNESCO, Director-General Irina Bokova deplores the loss of two lead-
ing scholars of Syrian antiquity, 20 August 2015, https://en.unesco.org/news/director-
general-irina-bokova-deplores-loss-two-leading-scholars-syrian-antiquity .
37  Ömür Harmanşah, “ISIS, Heritage, and the Spectacles of Destruction in the Global 
Media”, Near Eastern Archaeology, vol. 78, no. 3, Special Issue: the Cultural Heri-
tage Crisis in the Middle East (September 2015), pp. 170-177, p. 170.
38  In the case of ISIL /Dae’sh maximum impact was intended at three distinct levels: 
“(1) locally, by providing the Islamic State with an aura of invincibility that weakens 
resistance as it moves into new territory; 2) regionally, by reinforcing a sense of inevi-
table success in incipient movements in neighbouring countries; and 3) internation-
ally, by attracting recruits to the cause, exhorting some to join battle on the lands of 
the Kaliphate and others to act alone in their home countries”, see Smith, Burke, de 
Leiuen, Jackson see note 7, p. 174.
39  Smith, Burke, de Leiuen, Jackson see note 7, pp. 168; see also Barry Flood Finbarr, 
“Between Cult and Culture: Bamiyan, Islamic Iconoclasm, and the Museum”, The Art 
Bulletin, vol. 84, no. 4, 2002, pp. 641-659; Erik Nemeth even stated that in the case of 
the Buddhas, the political impact of cultural terrorism by the Taliban extended to the 
United States, see Nemeth see note 31, p. 32. 
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Buddhism attracted the attention of the media internationally (...)”,40 it 
was observed.
Meanwhile, other non-state armed groups started using cultural 
property strategically, for they have grasped the high symbolic value of 
cultural monuments and sites. When ISIL (Da’esh) started in mid-2014 
a practice of deliberate damaging prominent archaeological sites such a 
Nineveh, Nimrud, Hatra, Ashur and Palmyra, ISIL had choreographed 
the cultural heritage destructions in Syria, as “mediatic spectacles 
of violence aimed at objects and sites of heritage”.41 By deliberately 
choosing, in a calculated way, ancient statues instead of smaller 
antiquities, ISIL’s media performances in Syria, but also Iraq, operated 
much like a “reality show that effectively mobilizes the consumerism of 
visual media”42. Not only the local communities were shocked, but also 
the international community.  
Radical modern, high-tech and systematical use of networked social 
media as YouTube, Facebook, Twitter, Instagram evolved as a central 
element of ISIL (Da’esh) strategies with an estimated 90,000 posted 
messages a day online through a variety of platforms43 or at least 46,000 
twitter accounts at its peak.44 Thus, it may be said that the “Islamic 
State’s counter-heritage campaign took place as a media performance 
on a global scale” 45. 
III. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS ADDRESSING 
CULTURAL HERITAGE
Some important new legal developments in the field of cultural 
heritage protection are related to UN Security Council Resolutions that 
40  Nemeth see note 31, p. 31.
41  Harmanşah see note 38, p. 170.
42  Harmanşah see note 38, p. 175.
43  Smith, Burke, de Leiuen, Jackson see note 7, p. 172.
44  J.M. Berger and Jonathan Morgan, “The ISIS Twitter census: Defining and de-
scribing the population of ISIS supporters in Twitter”, Analysis Paper No. 20. The 
Brookings Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World, Washington D.C., The 
Brookings Institution, March 2015, p. 2;  Jytte Klausen, “Tweeting the Jihad: Social 
media networks of Western foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq”, Studies in Conflict & 
Terrorism, vol. 38, no. 1, 2015, pp. 1-22, p. 20.
45  Harmanşah see note 38, pp. 171.
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have been drafted recently, some of them in close cooperation with 
UNESCO. It will be shown that various Security Council resolutions 
paved the way for considering cultural heritage protection as a “security 
issue” in the United Nations. 
In recent years the Council has paid attention to the fact that non-
state actors and terrorist groups specifically, “have exploited destruction 
of cultural heritage as a fundraising mechanism and a war tactic”46.
A. CULTURAL HERITAGE AND THE NEXUS TO PEACE 
AND SECURITY
Since 2013/14,47 the protection of cultural heritage has become 
a rather regular “component of a ‘threat to international peace and 
security’, i.e. the trigger for binding UN Security decisions” under Art. 
39 UN Charter.48
To begin with, in its Resolution 2170 (2014), adopted on 15 
August 2014, the Security Council reaffirmed that “terrorism in all its 
forms and manifestations constitutes one of the most serious threats 
to international peace and security”49. At the same time, the Council 
reiterated its condemnation “of ISIL, ANF and all other individuals, 
groups, undertakings and entities associated with Al-Qaida for ongoing 
and multiple criminal terrorist acts”50 while strongly condemning in 
particular the “destruction of cultural and religious sites”51.
In its equally binding Resolution 2199 (2015), as of 12 February 
46  Weiss and Connelly see note 4, p. 20.
47  See however, the landmark resolution 1483 (2003), where the Security Council 
decided for the first in the history of the United Nations to address the protection of 
the heritage of a UN member state (Iraq), stating that “all member States shall take 
appropriate steps to facilitate the safe return to Iraqi institutions of Iraqi Cultural prop-
erty and other items of archaeological, historical, cultural, rare scientific, and religious 
importance illegally removed from the Iraqi National Museum, the National Library, 
and other locations in Iraq since the adoption of resolution 661 (1990)”, UN Security 
Council, UN Doc. S/RES/1483, 22 May 2003, para. 7; see Catherine Phuong, “The 
Protection of Iraqi Cultural Property”, International & Comparative Law Quarterly, 
vol. 53, no. 4, 2004, pp. 985-998, p. 995.
48  Weiss and Connelly see note 4, p. 16.
49  S/RES/2170 (2014), preamble, para. 4.
50  S/RES/2170 (2014), preamble, para. 6.
51  S/RES/2170 (2014), para. 2.
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2015, the Council referred to the fact that “terrorism in all its forms and 
manifestation constitutes one of the most serious threats to international 
peace and security”52. The Council condemned “the destruction of 
cultural heritage in Iraq and Syria, particularly by ISIL and ANF, whether 
such destruction is incidental or deliberate, including the targeted 
destruction of religious sites and objects”53. Moreover, the Council 
noted with concern that income is generated by ISIL, ANF and others 
“from engaging directly or indirectly in the looting and smuggling of 
cultural heritage items from archaeological sites, museums, libraries, 
archives, and other sites in Iraq and Syria, which is being used to support 
their recruitment efforts and strengthening their operational capability 
to organize and carry out terrorist attacks”54.
This position was again confirmed and strengthened in Resolution 
2249 of 20 November 2015. The Council affirmed that 
“by its violent extremist ideology, its terrorist acts, its continuous gross 
systematic and widespread attacks directed against civilians, abuses of 
human rights and violations of international humanitarian law, including 
those driven on religious and ethnic ground, its eradication of cultural 
heritage and trafficking of cultural property (…) the Islamic State in Iraq 
and the Levant (ISIL, also known as Da’esh), constitutes a global and 
unprecedented threat to international peace and security”.55 
In very clear words, the Council condemned “in the strongest terms” 
the “barbaric acts of destruction and looting of cultural heritage carried 
out by ISIL”56 and called on all member states “that have the capacity 
to do so to take all necessary measures (…) on the territory under the 
control of ISIL (…) to redouble and coordinate their efforts to prevent 
and suppress terrorist acts committed specifically by ISIL (…) and 
other individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities associated with Al-
Qaida, and other terrorist groups (…)”57. 
In contrast to the previous resolutions Resolution 2347 (2017), 
as of 9 June 2017, is a non-binding general thematic resolution that 
52  S/RES/2199, preamble, para. 3.
53  S/RES/2199, para. 15.
54  S/RES/2199, para. 16.
55  S/Res/2249 (2015), preamble, para 6.
56  S/RES/2249 (2015), para. 3.
57  S/RES/2249 (2015), para. 5.
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was not adopted due to a certain crisis or event. For the first time ever, 
Resolution 2347 (2017) focused “exclusively on cultural heritage 
and its necessity for peace and security”, as has been stressed by 
former UNESCO Director-General.58 The Council noted “with grave 
concern the involvement of non-state actors, notably terrorist groups, 
in the destruction of cultural heritage and the trafficking in cultural 
property and related offences, in particular at the continued threat 
posed to international peace and security by the Islamic State in Iraq 
and the Levant (ISIL, also known as Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated 
individuals, groups, undertakings and entities.59 An additional security 
aspect concerns the threats posed by landmines and unexploded 
material/ordnance,60 not only for the living conditions of the local 
population but also for the restoration of cultural heritage in post-
conflict-situations. In its operational paragraphs, Resolution 2347 aims 
at safeguarding cultural heritage against destruction and trafficking 
and promotes a network of safe havens in the territories of Member 
States.61 Moreover, the Security Council mentioned future “preventive 
and emergency operations” and encouraged Member States to provide 
financial contributions to support them.62
Finally, in Resolution 2379 (2017), adopted on 21 September 2017, 
the Council condemned the destruction of cultural heritage, including 
archaeological sites, and trafficking of cultural property,63 while 
strengthening considerably the accountability of individual members 
of ISIL (Da’esh) who committed war crimes, crimes against humanity 
or genocide.
The brief overview reflects that the Council paved the way to a 
more comprehensive understanding of the existing threats for cultural 
heritage. It may be stressed that on the basis of this clearly established 
nexus to peace, collectors, art trader or auction houses, whenever they 
58  Letter of Irina Bokova to Ministers responsible for Relations with UNESCO 
CL/4210, United Nations Security Council Resolution 2347, 09/06/2017, p. 1.
59  S/RES/2347 (2017), preamble, para. 7.
60  S/RES/2347 (2017), preamble, para. 9 “noting with grave concern the serious threat 
posed to cultural heritage by landmines and unexploded ordnance”.
61  S/RES/2347 (2017), para. 16.
62  S/RES/2347 (2017), para. 15.
63  S/RES/2379 (2017), preamble, para. 5.
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are “associated” with the terrorist group Al-Qaida may come under the 
scrutiny of the Security Council (e.g. the sanctions list). This clearly is 
a step forward in the protection of cultural heritage against misuse.
By framing cultural heritage destruction as a security issue, the 
Security Council reacted in an adequate manner to ongoing crimes and 
illegal activities of terrorist groups. However, in a realistic stocktaking, 
it may be argued that the Council’s approach does not reflect any 
commitment to protect culture/cultural heritage for its own sake or 
value: The Council acts not or at least not primarily because of the 
intrinsic historic and/or aesthetic value of cultural monuments and 
artefacts or because they are important artistic landmarks of mankind, 
but rather in order to “cut off one avenue of terrorist financing”.64 
The above analysis reflects the fact that the Council is considering, 
above all, the relevance cultural heritage has for the promotion of 
terrorism and hence, for the stability of the regions affected. In this 
way, the Council is accentuating an instrumental relationship between 
cultural heritage in its own right and broader security aspects, taking 
into consideration also the fact that sales from trafficking illegally 
excavated or stolen objects may be used for operational activities or for 
recruiting new groups of militants. 
B. HERITAGE PROTECTION BY UN PEACE MISSIONS 
AND INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL ACCOUNTABILITY
Generally, the Security Council is the competent body to authorize 
multilateral enforcement measures also on the ground. The Council 
may do so at any time, provided a threat to peace and international 
security exists (Art. 39, 42 UN Charter). 
After terrorist groups as Ansar Dine and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic 
Maghreb (AQIM), had attacked Timbuktu’s mosques and damaged 
64  Edward C. Luck, “Cultural Genocide and the Protection of Cultural Heritage”, J. 
Paul Getty Trust Occasional Papers in Cultural Heritage Policy. No. 2. 2018.
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severely 14 of its mausoleums,65 the Council in its Resolution 2100 
(2013) mandated a UN Mission with the specific task of protecting 
Malian cultural heritage. Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the 
Council created the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission 
in Mali (MINUSMA). Its mandate included, inter alia, the stabilization 
of key population centres and support for the re-establishment of State 
authority throughout the country.66 In addition to that, the Council 
adopted a specific cultural heritage clause for MINUSMA “to assist the 
transitional authorities of Mali as necessary and feasible, in protecting 
from attack the cultural and historical sites in Mali, in collaboration 
with UNESCO”67. 
This robust mandate for cultural heritage protection in Mali as part 
of a binding UN Security Council resolution is another important recent 
development for cultural heritage protection: For the first time in UN 
history, the Council mandated explicit support for cultural preservation, 
advancing also a “paradigm for sharing the protection of objectives 
identified by the Security Council, UN and UNESCO”, as the Italian 
Centre for Higher Defence Studies put it in an informal paper.68  
It may be criticized, however, that MINUSMA was dispatched 
rather late, i.e. a couple of months after the main destructions of the 
Malian mausoleums had already taken place.69 Still, when the Council 
authorized the mission with its mandate for cultural heritage, the 
Council might have wished to protect Malian cultural heritage (e.g. 
mausoleums, manuscripts, holy shrines) against future terrorist attacks. 
Besides, MINUSMA actively took part in cultural heritage protection 
at a practical level: Together with UNESCO, MINUSMA supported the 
65  Concerning cultural heritage destruction in Mali see Lostal see note 6, p. 127 ff; 
Sabine von Schorlemer, “Military Intervention, the UN Security Council and the Role 
of UNESCO: The Case of Mali.” in Anne-Marie Carstens and Elisabeth Varner, eds., 
Intersections in International Cultural Heritage Law, Oxford University Press, 2019 
(forthcoming).
66  S/RES/2100 (2013), para. 16 (a).
67  S/RES/2100 (2013), para. 16 f.
68  Italian Centre for Higher Defence Studies, “The Legal Obligations to Protect Cul-
tural Properties and Identities during armed Conflict”, submitted to the Committee on 
Participation in Global Cultural Heritage Governance at the 78th biennial ILA Conference in Sydney 
August 2018 (on stock with the author). 
69  For detail see Schorlemer see note 65.
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restoration of mausoleums, e.g. by protecting the experts and sites.70 
Therefore, despite some serious security problems MINUSMA is 
facing on the ground,71 the adoption of MINUSMA’s mandate by the 
Security Council is an important signal to terrorist groups, warning 
them that the international community is ready to act when cultural 
heritage is destroyed wantonly. 
Not least, MINUSMA also supported early investigations of the 
International Criminal Court’s (ICC) Office of the Prosecutor in the case 
of Al Mahdi who was charged with intentionally directing attacks against 
ten sites of a religious and historic character, committed in Timbuktu 
between 30 June 2012 and 11 July 2012. Al Mahdi was successfully 
convicted on 27 September 2016 to nine years of imprisonment.72 The 
Chamber unanimously found Al Mahdi guilty within the meaning of 
Article 25 (3) (co-perpetration), of the crime of attacking the protected 
sites73 as a war crime under Article 8 (2) (e) (iv) of the Statute of Rome.74 
In its Judgement, the Trial Chamber VIII considered Al Mahdi to have 
been fully implicated in the destruction, e.g. by having supervised the 
execution of the operations by using his men from the Hesbah morality 
brigade and by personally participating in the attacks.75 In its Reparation 
Order, the Court further awarded Mali a fine of 2.7 million Euros, and 
the international community, represented by UNESCO, a symbolic 
reparation of one Euro.76
70  Ibid.
71  As of September 2018, 173 peacekeepers have been killed by attacks on MINUS-
MA personnel, see UN peacekeeping, ‘Fatalities by Mission, Year and Incident Type’, 
https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/fatalities.
72  International Criminal Court, The Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, Judgement and Sen-
tence, ICC-01/12-01/2015, 27 September 2016. 
73  All buildings with the exception of the Sheikh Mohamed Mahmoud Al Arawani 
Mausoleum had the status of protected UNESCO World Heritage sites under the 1972 
Convention; they were not military objectives, International Criminal Court, The 
Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, Judgement and Sentence, ICC-01/12-01/2015, 27 September 
2016. see para. 39.
74  Rome Statute, 2187 U.N.T.S., entry into force 1 July 2002.
75  Summary of the Judgment and Sentence in the case of The Prosecutor v. Ahmad Al Faqi 
Al Mahdi, 27 September 2016, https://www.icc-cpi.int/itemsDocuments/160926Al-
MahdiSummary.pdf. 
76  International Criminal Court, The Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, Reparations Order, ICC-
01/12-01/15, 17 August 2017; for detail see Ana Filipa Vrdoljak in this volume.
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Given the general importance of Resolution 2100 (2013), UNESCO 
in its 2017 Strategy for the Reinforcement of UNESCO’s Action for 
the Protection of Culture and the Promotion of Cultural Pluralism in 
the Event of Armed Conflict, pledged that it will build on the positive 
experience of the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 
2100 (2013) concerning MUNUSMA and propose “the integration of 
a module on the protection of cultural heritage and diversity within 
the standard training of peace-keeping forces”77. This is an important 
element in the follow-up process of Security Council resolution 2100 
(2013).
C. A “RESPONSIBILITY TO INTERVENE” (R2P)
A well-known problem in UN politics is related to the fact that 
the adoption of a Security Council resolution may be delayed or even 
hampered by a veto of the P-5. The question therefore is whether there 
is a responsibility to intervene in certain cases.
As has been stated by the Heads of State and Government in 
September 2005 in the UN World Summit Outcome Document,78 
specified by the UN Secretary-General,79 each state has the responsibility 
to protect its populations from “genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing 
and crimes against humanity” (so-called atrocity crimes). When 
national authorities manifestly fail to fulfil their own responsibility 
to protect their population from atrocity crimes mentioned above, the 
international community has the responsibility to take action through 
peaceful diplomatic and humanitarian means and, if that fails, through 
other more forceful means, including the use of military force. In this 
context, Heads of State and Government declared:
“we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive 
manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, 
including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with 
relevant regional organisations, as appropriate should peaceful means 
77   UNESCO Strategy para. 31.
78  UN General Assembly, 2005 World Summit Outcome, Res. 60/1, UN Doc. A/
RES/60/1, 24.10.2005, para. 138-139.
79  UN, Report of the Secretary-General on Implementing the Responsibility to Pro-
tect, UN Doc. A/63/677, New York, NY, 12 January 2009, para. 61.
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be inadequate (…).”80  
Hence, the question is whether R2P, developed by the International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS)81 and 
accepted by all United Nations member states,82 may be value-added 
for the future international protection of cultural heritage?
The differentiated levels of the R2P may also be relevant for cultural 
heritage protection against terrorist attacks.83 As the ICC’s Prosecutor 
Fatou Bensouda stated, “we all have a duty to protect cultural heritage”84. 
And military experts stress that previously, the existing obligations 
during the conduct of operational activities were “avoiding damage to 
cultural assets in the combat zone”, while now it appears necessary 
“to adopt caution in order to protect the monumental sites submitted to 
forces under UN mandate”85. 
  In that context, a UNESCO Concept Paper for the Application 
of Responsibility to Protect to the Protection of Cultural Property in 
preparation of an Expert Meeting on ‘Responsibility to Protect’ as 
Applied to the Protection of Cultural Heritage in Armed Conflict, 
80  UN General Assembly, 2005 World Summit Outcome, Res. 60/1, UN Doc. A/
RES/60/1, 24.10.2005, para. 139.
81  See December 2001 Report of the International Commission on Intervention and 
State Sovereignty (ICISS), co-chaired by Gareth Evans and Mohamed Sahnoun.
82  As far as the general obligation of states are concerned, the UN-Secretary-General 
in his 2009 Report on Implementing the Responsibility to Protect stated that “the 
provisions of paragraphs 138 and 139 of the Summit Outcome are firmly anchored 
in well-established principles of international law. Under conventional and custom-
ary international law, States have obligations to prevent and punish genocide, war 
crimes and crimes against humanity”, see UN, Report of the Secretary-General on 
Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, UN Doc. A/63/677, New York, NY, 12 
January 2009, para. 3.
83  UNESCO, Expert meeting on the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ and the protection of 
cultural heritage, Recommendations, Paris, 26-27 November 2015, UNESCO Doc. 
38 C/49.
84  International Criminal Court and UNESCO Strengthen Cooperation on the Protec-
tion of Cultural Heritage, 6 November 2017, https://en.unesco.org/news/internation-
al-criminal-court-and-unesco-strengthen-cooperation-protection-cultural-heritage.
85  Italian Centre for Higher Defence Studies see note 70, p. 1.
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hosted by the UNESCO Secretariat in Paris, 26-27 November 2015,86 
formulated the hypothesis that an “expansion of the doctrine of R2P to 
include the protection of cultural property will strengthen safeguarding 
measures of such cultural heritage under threat”87. 
The Responsibility to Protect Cultural Heritage was described as 
an “innovative way to deal with new threats of international extinction 
of cultural heritage in combination with massive human rights 
violations“88. Still, the scope of application of R2P regarding cultural 
heritage is controversial.
While some authors squarely object to apply R2P, also fearing 
mission creep as, for example, in the Libyan Resolution 1973 (2011),89 
others advocate a rather broad scope of application and suggest to 
apply R2P whenever attacks against cultural heritage amount either to 
war crimes, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing or genocide. As 
Federico Lenzerini stated: “(…) since intentional destruction of cultural 
heritage amounts to a war crime and a crime against humanity, it falls 
directly within the scope of R2P which (…) applies as a minimum to 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity 
(…)”90. 
86  Paris Expert meeting on the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ and the protection of cultur-
al heritage, Recommendations, Paris, 26-27 November 2015; Sabine von Schorlemer, 
“The Usefulness of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ as Applied to the Protection of 
Cultural Heritage in Armed Conflict” in Marc-André Renolds and Alessandro Chechi, 
eds., Cultural Heritage Law and Ethics: Mapping the Recent Developments, Geneva, 
Art-Law Centre, 2017, pp. 71-93.
87  UNESCO, “Concept Paper: Proposal for an Expert Group Meeting to discuss the 
Application of Responsibility to Protect to the Protection of Cultural Property” No-
vember 2015 (on stock with the author), p. 1.
88  Sabine von Schorlemer, “Paper for the Expert Group Meeting to Discuss the Appli-
cation of the Responsibility to Protect to the Protection of Cultural Property”, Written 
Notes for the UNESCO Expert Meeting “Responsibility to Protect and the Protection 
of Cultural Property” at UNESCO Headquarters, Paris, 26-27 November 2015 (on 
stock with the author), p. 2.
89  See S/RES/1973 (2011), as of 17 March 2011; for detail of that mandate cf. Thomas 
H. Lee, “The Law of War and the Responsibility to Protect Civilians: A Reinterpreta-
tion”, Harvard International Law Journal, vol. 55, no. 4, 2014, pp. 251-321, p. 293; 
Oliver Stuenkel, “The BRICS and the Future of R2P. Was Syria or Libya the Excep-
tion?”, Global Responsibility to Protect, vol. 6, 2014, pp. 3-28, p. 3.
90  Lenzerini see note 5, p. 80.
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In contrast to that, independent UNESCO experts as Frederic 
Rosén took a more restrictive stance and argued that there should be no 
“stand-alone R2P category for war crimes against cultural property.”91 
Indeed, the rationale of R2P is to prevent atrocity crimes, i.e. crimes 
that are generally considered be more serious than plain war crimes 
against cultural property. According to the International Commission 
on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS)’s groundwork on R2P, 
military intervention is justified only in case of “large scale loss of 
life” or “large scale ‘ethnic cleansing’, actual or apprehended, whether 
carried out by killing, forced expulsion, acts of terrors or rape”92. Along 
these lines, the 2017 Getty Trust Research Paper on “Cultural Cleansing 
and Mass Atrocities” proposed to adapt the criteria for military force for 
cultural protection purposes to include henceforth: “Large scale loss of 
cultural heritage, actual or apprehended, with genocidal intent or not, 
which is the product of deliberated action by a state or a non-state actor, 
or of neglect or inability to act, or of a failed-state situation; or large-
scale cultural cleansing, actual or apprehended”93.
According to the author, it is rather the combined effect of particular 
attacks on cultural property by non-state actors and massive human 
rights violations which lead to the gravity required for R2P.  Given the 
recent instances of crimes in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Libya, Mali and other 
places, it seems feasible to expand R2P and include atrocity crimes as 
“cultural cleansing” which are directed against cultural property and 
people’s human rights. Cultural heritage destructions in combination 
with massive human rights violations (e.g. displacement, torture, murder, 
enslavement, persecution or even genocide as in the case of Yazidis in 
91  Frederik Rosén, “Food for Thought, Paper on Cultural Heritage Destruction and 
R2P”, Written Notes for the UNESCO Expert Meeting “Responsibility to Protect and 
the Protection of Cultural Property” at UNESCO Headquarters, Paris, 26-27 Novem-
ber 2015 (on stock with the author), p. 1. See, however, Francesco Francioni, and Fed-
erico Lenzerini, “Responsibility to Protect Meeting”, Written Notes for the UNESCO 
Expert Meeting “Responsibility to Protect and the Protection of Cultural Property” 
at UNESCO Headquarters, Paris, 26-27 November 2015 (on stock with the author).
92  December 2001 Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty (ICISS), p. 32; Sabine von Schorlemer, “The Responsibility to Protect as 
an Element of Peace. Recommendations for its Operationalisation, Policy Paper 28 of 
the Peace and Development Foundation, Bonn 2007.
93  Weiss and Connelly see note 4, p. 38.
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Iraq94) reflect the framework for which R2P has been developed. On 
that basis, it may be argued that R2P encompasses cultural property 
when States are unwilling or unable to respect their obligations, e.g. in 
cases of willful targeting or deliberate destruction of cultural property 
by terrorist actors, leading to the risk of extinction/cultural cleansing.95 
To conclude, there is leeway for an expansive interpretation of R2P 
to be applied on cultural property. In the view of the author, R2P is 
a useful tool to legitimize action by the international community and 
Member States to protect cultural heritage threatened also by non-
state actors, whenever a State is unable or unwilling to do so. The R2P 
approach as applied to cultural heritage provides a stronger basis to 
the international community to intervene in order to save humanity’s 
past incorporated in precious cultural treasures. Whenever a case of 
“cultural cleansing” reaches the threshold of a “threat to peace”, the 
international community, represented by the United Nations, is supposed 
to take action to protect populations/communities from mass atrocity, 
when the territorial state is not able or willing to comply with its own 
responsibility. Under these circumstances, also third states may have 
recourse to armed force, provided the military action is carried out with 
the authorization of the SC pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN Charter.96 
Details of R2P as applied to cultural property, in particular its content 
and practical measures of cultural protection (e.g. safe havens, cultural 
protected zones, preventive deployment, robust cultural protection 
mandates for UN peace missions) should be explored further, for 
example by an international commission composed of independent 
experts as Weiss/Connelly suggested.97
94  The British Council reported that at least 20 historic Yazidi places of worship 
around Dohuk, Mosul and Sinjar have been destroyed between 2014-2016 with the 
ensuing risk that cultural identity, memories and practices will disappear (britishcoun-
cil.org, “Preserving Yazidi Heritage and Identity”).
95  Lenzerini see note 5, p. 80.
96  Military action must be “a last resort and the relevant decision must be taken with 
the utmost caution” as Peter Hilpold stresses, see Peter Hilpold, “From Humanitar-
ian Intervention to the responsibility to protect” in Peter Hilpold, ed., The Respon-
sibility to protect (R2P). A new Paradigm of International Law?, Brill/Nijhoff, 2014, 
pp. 1-37, p. 31.
97  Weiss and Connelly see note 4, p. 39. 
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D. REFLECTION: MISSING ASPECTS IN CULTURAL 
SECURITY?
The UN Security Council resolutions analysed above serve a 
fundamental goal in the early 21st century: To defend the general 
interest of humanity to be protected against atrocities committed by 
non-state terrorist groups against people and their heritage. 
Still, the Security Council seems to have turned a “blind eye” on the 
relevance of intangible cultural heritage. So far the Council made no 
mention of intangible heritage despite the fact that intangible heritage of 
people (e.g. oral traditions and expressions, performing arts, rituals and 
festivities, traditional music and dance, traditional craftsmanship)98, is 
violated in manifold respects by armed attacks, whether in Iraq, in Syria, 
in Yemen, Libya or Mali. In many – and generally not well-documented 
cases – local communities are threatened with the extinction of important 
parts of their intangible heritage when located in conflict zones.
In that regard, the UNESCO General Conference’s 2017 Strategy 
for the Reinforcement of UNESCO’s Action for the Protection of 
Culture and the Promotion of Cultural Pluralism in the Event of 
Armed Conflict99 could be an “eye-opener”: The Strategy emphasizes 
that “there is today growing recognition that the protection of cultural 
diversity and promotion of cultural pluralism, through the safeguarding 
of the tangible and intangible heritage of communities” is “more than 
a cultural emergency”: “It is a security and humanitarian imperative in 
conflict and transition situations and an essential element in ensuring 
sustainable peace and development”100. 
In a similar vein the Italian Centre for Higher Defence Studies101 
emphasized that intangible heritage should come under the umbrella 
of military protection by UN peace missions. In an informal Paper 
98  Tullio Scovazzi, “The Definition of Intangible Cultural Heritage” in Silvia Borelli 
and Federico Lenzerini, eds., Cultural Heritage, Cultural Rights, Cultural Diversity. 
New Developments in International Law, Brill/Martinus Nijhoff, 2012, pp. 179-200, p. 
181; Janet Blake, ed., Safeguarding Intangible Heritage: Challenges and Approaches, 
Institute of Art and Law, 2007.
99  UNESCO Doc. 38 C/Resolution 48; revised on 24 October 2017 (UNESCO Doc. 
39/C/57, 24 October 2017).
100  Strategy para. 6.
101  Italian Centre for Higher Defence Studies see note 68.
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submitted to the Committee on the Participation in Global Cultural 
Heritage Governance at the 78th biennial ILA Conference in Sydney 
in August 2018, Lieutenant General Massimiliano del Casale and 
Lieutenant Umberto Colonel Montuoro urged:
“When defining a UN mandate and planning a deployment of a 
multinational contingent, the safeguard of mobile and immobile artefacts 
tangible and intangible must be taken in consideration. In other words, 
the aim of the military operations is to protect both the populations and 
historical sites during ongoing armed conflicts in war zones”.102 
The authors reflected critically the fact that the Hague Convention 
on the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict 
of 1954 and its Second Protocol of 1999 merely focus on the protection 
of cultural tangible goods while the 2003 UNESCO Convention on the 
Safeguarding of Intangible Heritage does not contain any specific rules 
for military operations. 103 Consequently, the judgment of the military 
experts is harsh: “The legal void in international law concerning the 
protection of human rights and dignity of the person appears to by vast 
and anachronistic”104. Against this background, the Italian Centre for 
Higher Defence Studies´ Paper emphasizes that “the planning of joint 
operations” is needed in military terms, regarding the protection of 
cultural sites and regarding the inhabitants.105 
The question may be asked, however, whether it is likely that the 
Security Council will include intangible heritage in its future security-
related framework. Traditionally, military rules address tangible 
heritage only, beginning with the Convention (IV) respecting the Laws 
and Customs of War on Land (1907) and its annexed Regulations 
concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, the 1935 Roerich 
Pact, up to the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property 
in the Event of Armed Conflict (1954), its Second Protocol (1999) and 
Additional Protocols I and II to the Geneva Conventions (1977). The 
need of a precise mandate and a realistic chance to implement it is an 
important operational requirement for armed forces. Overburdening 
102  Ibid., p. 1 f. (emphasis added by the author).
103  Ibid., p. 3.
104  Ibid., p. 3.
105  Ibid., p. 2.
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military mandates by including too many objects for protection ought 
to be avoided therefore. 
Before striving at integrating the protection of intangible heritage 
as an additional element in UN peace missions, it seems advisable to 
explore better coherence of existing obligations, e.g. by a mixed round 
table of military and UNESCO experts. The authors of the Italian 
Paper are right, therefore:  Better coordination among the 2003, 2005 
and 1954 conventions “is nowadays necessary and not deferrable”106. 
In particular, synergies between the 1954 Hague Convention on 
the Protection of Cultural Property in Armed Conflict and the 2003 
UNESCO Convention of the Safeguarding of Intangible Heritage, but 
also the 2005 Convention on the Diversity of Cultural Expressions in 
situations of armed conflict ought to be explored in more detail.107 
 
IV. CONCLUSION: THE ROLE OF UNESCO IN THE FIGHT 
AGAINST INTENTIONAL CULTURAL HERITAGE 
DESTRUCTION AND EXTREMISM
UNESCO, the UN specialized agency with a broad statutory 
competency not only for culture, but also education, science and 
communication, is rightly seen as the “most visible international 
institution working on protecting cultural heritage in zones of armed 
conflict”108. More specifically, “UNESCO is leading the fight against 
cultural cleansing”, “bringing all its expertise to bear in strategies to 
prevent violent extremism”.109 
For example, in reaction to the extinction of the Buddha statues in 
Afghanistan, the 32nd UNESCO General Conference, Paris, 17 October 
2003, adopted the “Declaration Concerning the Intentional Destruction 
106  Ibid., p. 4. Drafting new tools, e.g. an authoritative interpretation concerning a 
broader definition of cultural heritage, including intangible heritage under Art. 1 of the 
Hague Convention (1954) or new UNESCO guidelines concerning protection against 
deliberate attacks on cultural heritage in armed conflict may be an option.
107  See already Schorlemer see note 27, pp. 610.
108  Weiss and Connelly see note 4, p. 22.
109  Para. 24.11, Records of the General Conference, Proceedings, 38th session, Paris 
2017, http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0024/002479/247901m.pdf.
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of Cultural Heritage”110. This is the first universal manifesto in the 
history of the United Nations that addresses and defines intentional 
attacks.111
In response to large-scale systematic destruction and looting of 
cultural sites in Syria, Iraq, Libya, Yemen, Mali, but also attacks on 
cultural diversity and cultural/religious minorities, infringing on their 
human rights and security in many parts of the world, UNESCO 
adopted the Strategy for the Reinforcement of UNESCO’s Action for 
the Protection of Culture and the Promotion of Cultural Pluralism in 
the Event of Armed Conflict.112 In adition to intentional destruction, 
collateral damage, forced neglect and organized looting/illicit 
trafficking, para. 1 of the Strategy mentions “terrorism” as a threat to 
cultural heritage in armed conflict. The overall objective of the Strategy 
is to strengthen Member states’ ability to prevent, mitigate and recover 
the loss of cultural heritage and diversity as a result of conflict and to 
incorporate the protection of culture into humanitarian action, security 
strategies and peacebuilding processes.113 
Furthermore, in order to explore practical instruments for protection 
in times of imminent threats for the cultural heritage of people, e.g. 
by creating cultural protected zones or safe havens, the UNESCO 
Secretariat hosted the “Expert Meeting on ‘Responsibility to Protect’ 
as Applied to the Protection of Cultural Heritage in Armed Conflict” 
in November 2015, as was already mentioned above.114 In November 
110  UNESCO Declaration concerning the International Destruction of Cultural Heri-
tage, 17 October 2003, http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=17718&URL_
DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html. See Federico Lenzerini, “The UNES-
CO Declaration Concerning the Intentional Destruction of Cultural Heritage: One 
Step Forward and Two steps Back”, Italian Yearbook of International Law, vol. 13, 
2003, pp. 131-145. 
111   UNESCO Declaration 2003 para. II.2 defines intentional attacks as “an act intend-
ed to destroy in whole or in part cultural heritage, thus compromising its integrity, in 
a manner which constitutes a violation of international law or an unjustifiable offence 
of the principles of humanity and dictates of public conscience.”
112  UNESCO Strategy for the Reinforcement of UNESCO´s Action for the Protection 
of Culture and the Promotion of Cultural Pluralism in the Event of Armed Conflict (38 
C/Resolution 48); revised on 24 October 2017 (UNESCO Doc. 39/C/57), 24 October 
2017.
113  Strategy para. 16.
114  Regarding R2P see above.
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2017, a high-level panel discussion at UNESCO Headquarters focussed 
on “Responding to Cultural Cleansing, Preventing Violent Extremism”. 
As far as emergency funding in times of crises is concerned, the 
Heritage Emergency Fund115 was established, followed by the new 
ALIPH fund, established in December 2016 in Abu Dhabi by France 
and the United Arab Emirates.116 In addition to that, UNESCO launched 
several campaigns related to the protection of cultural heritage in zones 
of armed conflict. The 2014 EU-financed “Emergency Safeguarding 
on the Syrian Cultural Heritage” project 117 was followed by the social 
media campaign “Unite4Heritage” in 2015118 that raises awareness 
and promotes culture-sensitivity in the civil society of affected states. 
The Heritage Passport, developed by UNESCO in cooperation with 
Malian authorities, is another initiative aiming at stimulating a feeling 
of responsibility among the local population for “their” cultural 
treasures.119 
Furthermore, UNESCO’s Global Coalition-Unite for Heritage 
was launched in June 2015 in order to establish a broad network 
of stakeholders in heritage protection.120 As part of that network, 
115  Website of the Heritage Emergency Fund: http://www.unesco.org/donate/hef/, 
UNESCO, 2017 Heritage Emergency Fund Annual Progress Report, https://en.unesco.
org/sites/default/files/hef_2017_annual_progress_report-v2_en.pdf 
116  UNESCO, France and the Emirates launch an International Alliance for the Protec-
tion of Heritage, 20.03.2017 http://www.unesco.org/new/en/media-services/single-
view/news/unesco_france_and_the_emirates_launch_an_international_alli/ concern-
ing ALIPH, see Weiss and Connelly see note 4 , p. 23 f.; Paolo Foradori, Serena 
Giusti and Alessandro Giovanni Lamonica, “Reshaping Cultural Heritage Protection 
Policies at a Time of Securitisation: France, Italy, and the United Kingdom”, The In-
ternational Spectator, vol. 53, no. 3, 2018, pp. 86-101, p. 90.
117  Heritage in Danger: Emergency Safeguarding of the Syrian Cultural Heritage, 
28.06.2017, http://www.unesco.org/new/en/brussels/about-this-office/single-view/
news/heritage_in_danger_emergency_safeguarding_of_the_syrian_cul; The Emer-
gency Safeguarding of the Syrian Cultural Heritage project, https://en.unesco.org/
syrian-observatory/emergency-safeguarding-syrian-cultural-heritage-project.
118  Website #Unite4Heritage, http://www.unite4heritage.org/ .The “UNITE4Heritage” 
initiative received a positive response, S. Kane, Archaeology and Cultural Heritage in 
Post-Revolution Libya in: Near Eastern Archaeology 78, 2015, p. 211.
119  https://whc.unesco.org/en/news/981/. 
120  Launch of global Unite for Heritage Coalition in Bonn, 29 June 2015, https://whc.
unesco.org/en/news/1303/. 
55
Sabine von Schorlemer
the Government of the Italian Republic signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding with UNESCO for initiatives in favor of countries facing 
emergencies that may affect the protection and safeguarding of culture 
and the promotion of cultural pluralism (Rome, 16 February 2016).121 
The Parties agreed that in response to a request by a UNESCO member 
state facing crisis or natural disaster, the Italian Task Force may be able 
to operate as well in and after the crisis, e.g. by devising operational 
plans for urgent safeguarding measures or “assisting in transferring 
movable cultural property at risk to safe havens”122. 
In order to better protect cultural heritage in times of crisis and armed 
conflict, UNESCO successfully established new partnerships with 
international agencies in recent years. For example, a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) was signed with the International Committee of 
the Red Cross (ICRC) (Geneva, 29 February 2016).123 The Memorandum 
constitutes the first agreement of its kind signed between the two 
organisations, encouraging the ICRC to play a more active operational 
role in the rescue of cultural property under imminent threat.
Moreover, the joint cooperation between UNESCO and the ICC 
that started in 2012 in the wake of the deliberate destruction of cultural 
heritage in Mali, is to be recalled. It consisted in providing detailed 
documentation on cultural heritage destructions to the ICC, thereby 
establishing a “strong basis for further collaboration, especially when 
countries have not yet ratified relevant Conventions or are not States 
Parties to the ICC”.124 Meanwhile, the ICC and UNESCO further 
strengthened their collaboration regarding the protection of cultural 
heritage: On 6 November 2017 the UNESCO Director-General and 
the ICC’s Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, signed a Letter of Intent that 
121  The official text of the Memorandum of Understanding is available at: http://itra.
esteri.it/Ricerca_Documenti/wfrmRicerca_Documenti.aspx  . 
122  Ibid.
123  Memorandum of Understanding between UNESCO (represented by Irina Bokova) 
and ICRC (represented by Peter Maurer), signed in Geneva on 29 February 2016; 
ICRC, Agreement between the ICRC and UNESCO on the protection of cultural 
property – Q&A, 8 March 2016 (https://www.icrc.org/en/document/cultural-proper-
ty-in-armed-conflict.
124  UNESCO Strategy, para. 25.
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formalized the cooperation of both institutions.125 
In order to fight the root causes of heritage destruction and extremism, 
UNESCO is advocating strongly a comprehensive approach, using 
also its “soft power” across the Organization’s mandate. In a broader 
perspective, the UNESCO Executive Board expressed its concern about 
the worldwide challenge of recruitment and radicalization to violent 
extremism of youth in media, in communities and in schools.126 The 
Board therefore decided to develop new educational resources in order 
to facilitate the prevention of violent extremism through education.127 
Efforts for training and capacity-building are made, including educators, 
policy-makers, parents and the youth.128 
Thus, despite its limited resources,129 UNESCO is an important actor 
in promoting a culture of peace, justice and tolerance on a worldwide 
scale. 
125  https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=171106_OTP_Unesco.
126  UNESCO Executive Board UNESCO, “UNESCO’s role in promoting education 
as a tool to prevent violent extremism (197 EX/46 and Corr.; 197 EX/DG.INF; 197 
EX/53)”, Doc. 197 EX/SR.8, 23 November 2015, para. 2.
127  Ibid., para. 17 (c).
128  Ibid., para. 17 (g); UNESCO Youth and the Internet Fighting Radicalization and 
Extremism, 16-17 June 2015, https://en.unesco.org/youth-and-internet-fighting-radi-
calization-and-extremism. A Teacher’s Guide on the Prevention of Violent Extrem-
ism, 2016, http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0024/002446/244676e.pdf  Preventing 
violent extremism through education, A guide for policy-makers, 2017, http://unes-
doc.unesco.org/images/0024/002477/247764e.pdf. See also UNESCO global net-
working for education to prevent violent extremism, 23 April 2018, https://en.unesco.
org/news/unesco-global-networking-education-prevent-violent-extremism. Youth led 
guide on prevention of violent extremism through education, 2017, http://unesdoc.
unesco.org/images/0026/002605/260547e.pdf. UNESCO in Action Preventing Vio-
lent Extremism Worldwide, https://en.unesco.org/sites/default/files/unesco_in_ac-
tion-pve_worldwide-en.pdf.
129  For detail see Klaus Hüfner, What can save UNESCO?, Frank & Timme, 2016, 
pp. 61. 
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